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Using a new tax database for 28 countries and a variety 
of econometric methods, this paper contributes to 
the debate on the effects of fiscal policy on economic 
activity in a number of ways. The analysis finds that 
tax cuts have a stimulative effect on economic growth 
in developing countries. Lowering the personal income 
tax rate by 1 percentage point, or cutting revenues by 
1 gross domestic product of gross domestic product 
increases gross domestic product by 0.3–0.4 percent on 
impact and 0.8 percent in the long run. The author finds 
that cuts in personal income taxes are more effective 
in stimulating growth than cuts in corporate or valued 
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added tax rates. The author incorporates debt dynamics 
into a fiscal vector autoregression model for a number of 
developing countries. Existing estimates of the effects of 
fiscal policy on growth use linear time-series methods, 
which may assess the effects of fiscal policy along a debt-
path that is unsustainable. Incorporating the non-linear 
relationship between government expenditure, taxes, 
and debt alters estimates of the impact of fiscal policy on 
gross domestic product in several countries. In Brazil, for 
example, conventional time-series methods may overstate 
the effects of fiscal policy on gross domestic product, by 
ignoring the detrimental effects of debt accumulation.Fiscal Policy and Debt Dynamics in
Developing Countries
Ethan Ilzetzki￿
JEL Codes: E62, F41, H63
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11 Introduction
In recent years, the debate on the use of …scal policy as a countercyclical
stabilization tool has been central to the agenda of macroeconomic policy-
makers to the extent not seen for a generation or more. Several governments
responded rapidly and aggressively to the most signi…cant …nancial crisis
in recent memory. One of the …rst acts of the newly-elected Obama ad-
ministration in February 2009 was to pass a $787 billion stimulus package
through the U.S. Congress. More recently, in December 2010, President
Obama proposed a bill, receiving bipartisan support, prolonging both the
Bush administration’s tax cuts and his own administration’s extension of
unemployment-bene…t duration. A major justi…cation of these measures was
as additional stimulus to economic activity. Similar policies have been pur-
sued in the U.K., with signi…cant increases in government spending and cuts
in the VAT rate during 2009-10. Even in the developing world, governments
made similar e¤orts, with the Chilean government increasing its expenditures
by close to 3 percent of Chile’s gross domestic product, for example.
More recently, the debate has swung from stimulus to austerity. Concerns
about the solvency of a number of European governments, most prominently
in Greece and Ireland, have reversed the policy trend. Governments through-
out Europe have been legislating signi…cant increases in taxation and cuts
in public expenditure. Most recently, the Irish government, facing a loss in
market con…dence for its sovereign debt, took measures to increase public
savings by more than 3 percent of GDP. Concern of similar debt sello¤s led
the incoming Parliament in the UK to take decisive measures to cut pub-
lic expenditures. In the U.S., Congressional Republicans have vowed to cut
discretionary government spending by $100 billion.
How e¤ective are packages of …scal stimulus in fueling economic recovery?
2How costly are austerity measures in deepening recessions? To what extent
does a country’s degree of indebtedness a¤ect the impact of stimulus and
austerity? What are the merits of using tax policy relative to expenditure
measures in using …scal policy for stabilization- or debt-reduction purposes?
These important policy questions have stimulated a signi…cant revival
of the empirical study of the e¤ects of …scal policy on economic activity.
This literature has focused primarily on the United States or other OECD
countries.
In a recent contribution, Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh (2010) (IMV) as-
sembled high-frequency data on government purchases for a large sample
of countries. IMV then estimate the e¤ects of government expenditure on
output using structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methods. We extend
their evidence along two dimensions. First, we present a new dataset on tax
revenues, tax rates, and tax elasticities for a sample of 28 countries, most
of which are less-developed. This new dataset allows us to jointly estimate
the e¤ects of taxes and government purchases on output using panel time-
series econometric methods. Second, using methods introduced by Favero
and Giavazzi (2007), we explore the degree to which government indebted-
ness a¤ects the impact of …scal policy.
An outline of the paper, and its main …ndings, can be summarized as
follows. In Section 2, we outline the new dataset and discuss the methodology
used to calculate average marginal tax rates and tax elasticities. Section 3
is a preliminary exploration of the data, where we use panel data methods
(OLS and Arellano-Bond GMM estimates) to estimate the e¤ects of tax
cuts on economic output. We …nd that a cut in personal income taxes
by 1 percentage point increases GDP by 0.16%. The e¤ect is more
substantial in developing countries, where GDP increases by close to
0.4% in response to a similar tax cut. Results regarding corporate- and
3value-added-taxes are less clear.
Section 4 uses Structural Vector-Autoregressive (SVAR) methods, as in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to estimate the e¤ects of …scal policy in a
number of country groupings. We re-a¢rm the results in IMV: government
expenditure is more potent in expanding output in high-income
countries than in developing countries; in closed economies than
in open economies; and under …xed than under ‡exible exchange
rates. These results are robust to the inclusion of taxes as an additional
control. We …nd, however, that the tax multiplier is virtually zero
in most country-groupings. This is consistent with previous …ndings using
SVAR methods. The exception is developing countries where the tax
multiplier is 0.3 on impact and close to 0.8 in the long run.
Finally, in Section 5 we use methods developed by Favero and Giavazzi
(2007) (FG) to incorporate debt dynamics into SVAR estimates of the impact
of …scal policy in a number of developing countries. In contrast to FG’s
…ndings for the United States, we …nd that debt dynamics signi…cantly
dampen the e¤ects of …scal policy in Brazil and Estonia, and to a
lesser extent in South Africa. The main channel identi…ed is that of …scal
reversals. Increases in government expenditure or tax cuts lead to higher
debt levels. These lead to reversals–decreases in government expenditure and
increases in taxation–within several years. These policy reversals diminish
the long-run expansionary e¤ect of the initial …scal stimulus. In the case of
Estonia, we …nd moreover that higher debt has a direct negative impact on
output growth. However, the mitigating e¤ects of debt on the impact of …scal
policy is not uniform. We do not …nd that incorporating debt dynamics in
SVAR regressions for Chile and Malaysia a¤ect estimates of the impact of
…scal policy on output.
The …nal section, section 6 concludes.
42 The data
A major challenge in estimating the e¤ects of …scal policy in developing
countries using VAR methods is the availability of reliable data. This paper
continues the e¤orts made by IMV to catalogue quarterly …scal data for
developing countries. While the focus in IMV is on the expenditure side
of the …scal ledger, we assemble data on tax revenues in this project. We
also introduce new series (these at an annual frequency) of average marginal
tax rates for a sample of 28 countries. This extends work such as Barro
and Sahasakul (1983) to a broader set of countries, including a number of
developing countries. Finally, for the purpose of our SVAR analysis, we
estimate tax elasticities for the countries in our sample. To our knowledge,
this is the …rst attempt to assemble time series of average marginal tax rates
for a cross-section of developing countries. It is also the …rst to estimate the
output elasticities of tax revenues, using macroeconomic data, for a number
of developing countries.
We outline a few of the steps involved in obtaining the time series used in
the analysis. We obtained the entire distribution of corporate, personal, and
value added tax rates from the OECD tax database for OECD members, and
from PricewaterhouseCoopers’ “Individual Taxes Worldwide Summaries” for
non-OECD countries. As an example, Figure 1 compares the marginal per-
sonal income tax rate schedules for Peru in 1993 and in 1994: directly before
and directly after, respectively, a major tax reform intended at simplifying
the tax system. Due to historically high rates of in‡ation, tax brackets in
Peru are based on income in “tax units” rather than in local currency.
We then followed the OECD’s methodology, outlined in Giorno et al
(1995) and Van den Noord (2000), for calculating the average marginal tax
rate for each country and year. We calculated the earnings elasticity of
5the personal income tax by following the OECD’s assumption that income
distribution is lognormal, and allowing for a distribution of income based on
each country’s Gini coe¢cient (taken in most cases from the World Bank’s
Povcal database) around average wage income (taken from national sources).1
We then located within this stylized income distribution the tax brackets as
outlined in the tax code. The average marginal tax rate is the average across
tax brackets of marginal tax rates weighted by total income in each bracket.
As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of the average mar-
ginal income tax rate for Brazil in 2008. The …gure shows the approximated
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of earnings. At each wage rate along
the X-axis, the CDF gives the percentage of total earnings in Brazil earned by
workers with wages below the indicated wage. There were three income-tax
brackets in Brazil in 2008: 0%, 15%, and 27.5%. Although 78% of work-
ers in Brazil fell into the lowest tax bracket, their earnings comprised only
39% of total earnings. Similarly, 14% of the working population faced a
15% marginal tax rate; this group earned 25% of Brazilian income. Finally,
the remaining 7% of the population, and 36% of national income, faced the
highest marginal rate. The average marginal tax rate in Brazil in 2008 was
calculated as the sum of the three marginal rates, each multiplied by the
share of total wage income that faced that marginal rate.
To assure the reader that our methodology is consistent with earlier es-
timates in the literature, Figure 3 compares the time series of the average
marginal income tax rate calculated by Barro and Redlick (2009), to that
obtained using our methodology. The two series are broadly similar, with
1Saez (2001) and others have argued that the Pareto distribution better characterizes
the actual income distribution in the United States than does the lognormal distribution.
Lopez and Serven (2006), in contrast, cannot reject a lognormal distribution of income in a
large sample of countries. To allow a direct comparison with the income elasticities of tax
revenues estimated by the OECD, we follow their methodology and assume a lognormal
income distribution.
6some di¤erences (of the order of one to two percentage points) in the 1984-5
and 1993-2000 periods.
Armed with average marginal income tax rates for each country in the
sample, we were then able to estimate the (wage-) income elasticity of tax
revenues. An increase in income that is distributed equally among current
wage earners would increase tax revenues by precisely the average marginal
tax rate. The wage elasticity of tax revenues is therefore the average marginal
tax rate divided by the average tax rate (which is tax revenues deriving from
labor income taxes divided by wage income).2 The …rst two columns of
Table 1 show our estimates of the earnings elasticity of tax revenues for the
countries in our sample in column A for income taxes and in column B for
social security taxes. The …rst two columns of Table 3 compare our estimates
with the OECD’s, for overlapping countries; they are virtually identical.
VAT rates are ‡at, while corporate income taxes are ‡at in most countries,
with some exceptions (such as Brazil). A single rate therefore summarizes
both the average and marginal rates for these taxes. The elasticity of these
taxes with respect to their respective tax bases is therefore 1. Figure 4 shows
all three average marginal tax rates for the countries in the sample.3
We then followed Giorno et al (1995) directly in using the elasticities of
tax revenues with respect to speci…c tax bases to obtain an overall output-
elasticity of tax revenues. Table 1 outlines the calculation of the output
elasticity of tax revenues in detail. The employment elasticity of wages is
shown in column D; the output elasticity of employment is presented in col-
umn E. As shown in detail in Giorno et al (1995) and Van den Noord (2000),
these two elacticities can be combined with the earnings elasticities to obtain
the output elasticity of income taxes. As the GDP identity, using income
2This measure varies, of course, from year to year. We average this measure across
years for each country.
3In Brazil and the United States we show the sales tax rather than the VAT.
7accounting, implies that total pro…ts are equal to GDP excluding wage earn-
ings, we can use the same elasticities to estimate the output elasticity of the
corporate income tax. Again, we follow the formulae in Giorno et al (1995)
and Van den Noord (2000) in calculating this elasticity.
The output elasticities of personal income taxes, social security taxes,
corporate income taxes and sales/VAT taxes are then summarized in columns
F to I. Finally, the output elasticities of speci…c taxes are weighted by their
share of total tax revenue to give the output elasticity of tax revenues.
Table 2 shows our estimates of elasticities using annual data. Table 3
compares our estimates of the output elasticity of tax revenues–using annual
data–with those of the OECD, for the seven countries that appear in both
samples. As noted earlier, our estimates of the personal income tax elasticity
are virtually identical. Thus all di¤erences in estimates of the …nal elasticities
are due to di¤erences in estimates of macroeconomic elasticities, such as the
output elasticity of employment.
3 The e¤ects of tax cuts: A panel estimate
We begin our analysis with a simple panel regression, which attempts to
determine the e¤ects of tax changes on output. In doing so, we follow the
speci…cation in Barro and Redlick (2009) who estimate the e¤ects of a lagged
change in the tax rate on current output. They argue that tax changes at a
one-year lag are more likely to have an e¤ect on output than contemporane-
ous changes and less likely to be a¤ected by reverse causation.
These regressions are an illustration of the data available in the collected
dataset. The methodology used here does not fully control for the possibility
of reverse causation: tax rates, particularly average marginal ones, respond
endogenously to business cycle conditions. For this reason, we address iden-
8ti…cation more seriously in the following section, using an SVAR approach.
An alternative tack would be to use a narrative of changes in tax policies
in the spirit of Romer and Romer (2010). To date, however, a historical
narrative of the changes in tax policy, together with the rationale for their
change (endogenous/exogenous to economic conditions) is not available for
a large sample of countries.4
We estimate the following equation
￿yn;t = ￿ + ￿￿￿n;t￿1 + ￿Zn;t + "n;t; (1)
where ￿yn;t is the growth rate of (the change in log) real GDP, ￿￿n;t￿1 is the
lagged change in the tax rate in country n; and Zn;t is a vector of controls,
some dated t and some t ￿ 1. We include the lagged unemployment rate
(UR(￿1)); Barro and Redlick (2010) also argue for including an exogenous
shock as a covariate. In their case they include the (squared) spread between
long-maturity Baa-rated bonds and Treasury bonds of similar maturity as a
measure of tightness of credit conditions. For our sample, including smaller
countries, we found it more appropriate to consider an external shock. We
include a trade shock variable, de…ned as the weighted average of the GDP
growth of each country’s trading partners. Each country’s trade shock is then
scaled by the country’s exports-to-GDP ratio, as a shock to trade might have
a larger e¤ect on countries more open to trade. Results are also robust to
inclusion of the lagged growth of government expenditure, although unlike
Barro and Redlick (2009), who include military expenditure only, inclusion
of total government expenditure raises concerns of reverse causation.
We estimate (1) in a panel of 28 countries, of which 19 are developing and
9 are high-income, based on World Bank classi…cations. Estimates reported
4In addition to the US narrative by Romer and Romer (2010), Cloyne (2011) compiled
a similar narrative for the UK.
9in Table 4 are from OLS estimates of (1) including …xed e¤ects, and from an
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. We include all three tax rate variables in
our regressions: the personal income tax rate (PITR), the corporate income
tax rate (CITR) and the VAT rate (or sales tax rate for the US and Brazil).
The …rst two columns of Table 4 give estimates for the entire sample. We
are particularly interested in estimates for developing countries–as their in-
clusion is novel to this dataset; we therefore show estimates for the developing
countries within the sample in the third and fourth columns.
We …nd a negative relation between increases in the average marginal
personal income tax rate and GDP growth in the following period. For
the entire sample, a one-percentage-point cut in the average marginal tax
rate increases GDP growth in the following period by 0.16%. The e¤ect is
larger for developing countries, where a tax cut of similar magnitude increases
output by close to 0.4%. This result is statistically signi…cant at the 95%
con…dence level for all speci…cations, and the 99% con…dence level for almost
all speci…cations. It is possible that the tax codes in developing countries are
more distortionary than those in high-income countries. This is a possible
explanation for the higher e¤ect of personal income tax changes in developing
countries.
Results for the corporate income tax rate and the VAT rate are less clear.
The e¤ect of changes in the corporate income tax rate are never statistically
signi…cant. The e¤ect of VAT increases are statistically signi…cant at the
95% con…dence level only in the OLS regression for the entire sample, and of
an unexpected sign. A potential explanation for this last result is that there
is very little time-series variability in the VAT, which gives the regression
less power to identify the e¤ects of VAT changes. Moreover, VATs have
frequently been introduced, and phased in, in the context of broader tax
reforms or other economic reforms. Thus the positive coe¢cient on the VAT
10rate may re‡ect the positive impacts of these reforms as a whole, rather than
a reliable prediction of the e¤ects of a cut in the VAT rate.
Other covariates generally have the expected signs and are statistically
signi…cant. Higher lagged GDP growth predicts higher growth in the current
period and growth in trading-partners’ GDP has a positive e¤ect on GDP.
Lagged unemployment, however, ‡ips signs in the di¤erent speci…cations and
is not statistically signi…cant in some cases.
In summary, we …nd preliminary evidence that cuts in personal income
taxes may have a stimulative e¤ect on GDP growth. This e¤ect is larger in de-
veloping countries. These results should be interpreted cautiously, however.
As mentioned, this is an illustrative regression that does not fully identify
changes in tax rates independently of changes in economic activity. Insofar
as tax policy is countercyclical in high-income countries, tax rates are likely
to increase during periods of high economic growth in this group of countries.
Thus estimates of the tax multiplier might be understated in the case of high
income countries. Insofar as tax policy is procyclical in developing countries,
and considering that the tax code tends to be less progressive in developing
countries, our estimates of the tax multiplier may be overstated in this group
of countries. On the other hand, the widespread prevalence of tax evasion
in developing countries might mean that actual tax rates are less relevant
for economic activity. In this case, our estimates of the tax multiplier re‡ect
the degree to which tax policy a¤ects economic outcomes only after …ltering
through tax evasion. The results of Table 4 are then biased downwards, if
interpreted as the economic e¤ects of actual e¤ective reductions in tax pol-
icy. To address these problems, we now turn to a more detailed study of the
e¤ects of taxes and government expenditure on output using structural VAR
methods.
114 The e¤ects of taxes and government
expenditures: An SVAR approach
4.1 Approach
A major di¢culty in estimating the e¤ects of government expenditure and
taxes on output at business cycle frequency is the identi…cation of …scal
shocks. While …scal policy may a¤ect economic activity, it also responds to
business cycle conditions. Disentangling this bicausal relation has been the
primary challenge for the empirical study of the macroeconomics of …scal
policy, and the main source of methodological debate.
Two main approaches have been pursued in the estimation of the e¤ects
of …scal policy on GDP. First, Barro (1981) suggested that large military
buildups in the U.S. could be viewed as exogenous increases in government
expenditure that should have no other immediate impact on economic activ-
ity. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2009) extended this methodol-
ogy, adding a narrative approach to the identi…cation of …scal shocks. They
document, through private forecasts and Business Week reporting, the time
at which the public began to anticipate increases in military expenditures.
Fisher and Peters (2009) use the stock prices of military contractors in a sim-
ilar attempt to detect when the private sector had internalized the news of an
impending government expenditure shock. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010)
use shocks to military expenditure as an instrument for military procure-
ment in U.S. states, while exploiting heterogeneity in the size of the military
industries across states. Shoag (2011) uses shocks to the value of pension
plans for state workers as an instrument for state-level public spending to
estimate the government-expenditure multiplier. In a novel e¤ort to extend
this approach outside the OECD, Kraay (2010) uses disbursement lags of
12World Bank projects to isolate exogenous changes in public expenditures
from those endogenously responding to the state of the business cycle..
Romer and Romer (2010) also adopt a narrative approach and document
the time of legislative changes to the U.S. tax code in an attempt to identify
tax policy shocks and classify whether tax changes were anticipated and
whether they were explicitly aimed at addressing business cycle conditions.
The second approach is the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR)
methodology introduced by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They identify …s-
cal shocks using information about …scal institutions. On the expenditure
side, their identifying assumption is that discretionary government expendi-
ture requires at least one quarter to respond to business cycle conditions.
For taxes, they use the output elasticities of tax revenues, estimated from
information about tax codes, to di¤erentiate between the endogenous reac-
tions of tax revenues to output ‡uctuations and unanticipated shocks to tax
revenues.
There has been much debate as to the relative merits of these two ap-
proaches. Perotti (2004) and Ramey (2009) have extensive comparisons of
the SVAR and narrative approaches to identifying government expenditure
shocks. Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh (2010) discuss extending the two ap-
proaches to countries outside the OECD. Favero and Giavazzi (2010) and
Perotti (2011) compare and attempt to reconcile the very di¤erent results
arising from Romer and Romer’s (2010) and the SVAR approaches to iden-
tifying tax policy shocks. Our study does not innovate on identi…cation of
…scal shocks; we rather take o¤ the shelf the Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
methodology. But it is worth making two points on identi…cation.
First, whatever the merits of the narrative and natural experiment ap-
proaches in general, when studying a broad cross-section of countries, these
methods are di¢cult to implement. While Barro (1981) and others have
13shown that military expenditure is the main source of volatility in U.S. gov-
ernment expenditure, this is not the case in all developing countries. In fact,
for some developing countries, military expenditure is a negligible portion of
budgetary expenditure. And in those developing countries whose expendi-
tures are driven by large swings in military spending, it is hard to argue that
these war buildups have little direct impact on GDP. Moreover, there is a
growing literature arguing that either business cycle conditions or swings in
natural resource prices are major drivers of public expenditure in developing
countries5. This makes it di¢cult to …nd a general econometric instrument
that drives public spending in developing countries, but which has no direct
e¤ect on economic activity. On the tax side, there is to date no compre-
hensive documentation of tax changes as in Romer and Romer (2010) for
countries other than the U.S. and the U.K.
Second, the SVAR approach may be more e¤ective at identifying unan-
ticipated …scal shocks in developing countries than in high-income countries.
while Ramey (2010) has presented evidence that SVAR shocks were fore-
casted by the private sector, this is less likely to be the case in developing
countries. As IMV discuss, government expenditure is very volatile on a
quarter-to-quarter basis in developing countries. Fiscal planning is poor and
not credible. Quarterly …scal data is subject to large revisions even a year or
two after the fact. It is therefore unlikely that the public will have foreseen
many of the …scal shocks identi…ed by an SVAR, and even less likely that
their exact timing at a quarterly frequency will have been known in advance.
Moreover, if the volatility of public expenditures is driven largely by politi-
cal pressures to increase expenditures when resources are abundant, a VAR
should be able to pick up on this relationship, as long as it is relatively sys-
5See for example Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) for
stylized facts; Talvi and Végh (2005), Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008) and Ilzetzki
(forthcoming) for political economy theories of this phenomenon.
14temic, and does not lead to a contemporaneous relationship between output
and public expenditures (due to implementation lags).
In addition, there are particular merits to the Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) approach to identi…cation of shocks to tax policy in developing coun-
tries. As noted in Section 3, estimates of the …scal multiplier from changes
in statutory rates may understate the economic e¤ect of e¤ective changes
in tax payments, when tax evasion is prevalent. As the Blanchard-Perotti
SVAR backs out shocks to tax revenues, it captures e¤ective changes in tax
payments, not only changes that are on the books. To illustrate the rele-
vance of this point, consider a government that improves the enforcement of
tax payments. However desirable this may be for …scal management, this
improved enforcement also entails an e¤ective increase in the tax burden.
Improved enforcement leads to a de-facto increase in e¤ective tax rates, the
omission of which may understate the e¤ects of tax policy. In contrast, back-
ing out shocks to tax policy from tax revenues captures changes in the actual
incidence of taxes.
We now detail the SVAR approach used in this study. We estimate the






CkYn;t￿k + Bun;t; (2)
where Yn;t is a vector of J macroeconomic variables. In this section J = 3
and this vector includes–from top to bottom–government expenditure gn;t,
tax revenues Tn;t, and GDP yn;t. The J ￿ J matrices Ck trace the k-order
autoregressive process of the macroeconomic system, while ut;t is a J￿1 vector
of structural shocks to the macroeconomic observables. Structural shocks are
assumed to be distributed N (0;1) and such that E [un;t (i)un;t (j)] = 0 8i 6=
j. The diagonal matrix B rescales these shocks to units of the macroeconomic
15variables, based on their respective variances. An allows for contemporaneous
relations amongst these variables.
The matrix An is allowed to vary from country to country. We use the
tax revenue elasticities shown in Table 1 to obtain heterogeneous values of
An (2;3). However, in order to maximize the estimation’s sample size, we do
not allow heterogeneity in the other values of the A matrix.
A reduced-form version of (2), where both sides of this equation are mul-
tiplied by A￿1
n , can be estimated via OLS. This provides us with estimates
of A￿1
n Ck and of the error terms "n;t ￿ A￿1
n Bun;t.
The estimated variance-covariance matrix of "n;t gives J (J ￿ 1) equations















There are J (J ￿ 1) unknowns in An and an additional J in Bn. J restrictions
are required on the elements of An to estimate the remaining elements. To














The parameters of greatest interest are agy and aty, as they determine the
e¤ects of government expenditure and taxes on output. We leave them un-
restricted. We use our tax elasticity estimates to determine ay￿. Following
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we also note that government purchases (as
opposed to transfers) have no automatically stabilizing components and set
ayg = 0. (In the PVAR estimation of this section, we use data on government
consumption as gn
t :)
16Finally, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Favero and Giavazzi (2007)
show that results are not sensitive to assuming aTg = 0; agT = 0 or setting
both to zero. Estimates presented here set agT = 0; but any of the alternative
assumption leads to essentially identical results.
4.2 Results
Following IMV, we pool countries in several ways, based on country charac-
teristics. In Figures 5 and 6 we show results for high income and developing
countries, respectively. Figures 7 and 8 present results for open and closed
economies, de…ned as in IMV as countries with ratios of trade (imports plus
exports) exceeding, or below, 60% of GDP, respectively. Finally, using the
classi…cation in Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011), we divide the sample
into country-episodes where the exchange rate was …xed and those where it
was ‡exible in Figures 9 and 10, respectively. The upper panel of each of these
…gures gives the cumulative multiplier to a shock to government consumption
at horizons ranging from one to twenty quarters. The lower panel gives the
cumulative multiplier in response to a shock to taxes. Point estimates are
presented in a solid line and the boundaries of the 90% con…dence interval,
estimated using Monte Carlo simulations with bootstrapped standard errors
and 500 repetitions, are shown in dotted lines. Reported regressions include
4 lags.
A number of results emerge from Figures 5 and 6. First, in high-income
countries the response of output to a $1 increase in government consumption
is estimated at approximately $0.8. The response is statistically di¤erent
from zero, but not from one, at every forecast horizon. The long run multi-
plier slightly exceeds 1, but error bands are wide at longer forecast horizons.
In developing countries, the response of output to increases in government
17consumption is more muted. On impact, output increases by merely 0.2 cents
for every dollar spent by the government, implying that more than 80% of
government expenditure is crowded out by other components of GDP (con-
sumption, investment or net exports). This estimate is statistically di¤erent
from zero, but is lower by a statistically signi…cant margin from our estimate
of the …scal multiplier in high-income countries. In the long run, govern-
ment consumption appears to be almost fully crowded out, with the long run
multiplier for developing countries estimated at 0.15. This estimate is not
di¤erent from zero by a statistically signi…cant margin, but can be said to be
lower than 1 with 99% con…dence.
Long-run estimates of the government expenditure multiplier are similar
to those found in IMV, but the impact multipliers in both these groups of
countries are larger in this study. There are di¤erent reasons for these diver-
gent results in the case of high-income countries and in the case of develop-
ing countries. In high-income countries, the current sample is signi…cantly
smaller than that used in IMV, with only 6 of the 19 countries from IMV in-
cluded in this sample. A bivariate regression with government consumption
and GDP as in IMV yields similar results as those reported here, when only
including the six countries that are in both studies.
While the sample of developing countries is not perfectly overlapping with
that of IMV (only 17 of the 20 countries in IMV are included here), this is
not the main cause for the di¤erence in the estimates of …scal multipliers.
The exclusion of tax revenues from the regression in IMV may have under-
stated the short-run impact of government consumption on GDP (and lead
to estimation of a negative impact multiplier). In fact, as shown in Figure
11, taxes are found to rise in response to government consumption increases,
which may bias results of estimations that exclude taxes.
Turning to the e¤ects of taxes on output, Figure 5 re-a¢rms results seen
18elsewhere in SVAR estimates of taxes on output for industrialized countries.
As in Perotti (2004), the e¤ects are small and not statistically signi…cant.
See also Caldara (2011) on the range of tax multipliers that are plausible
given reasonable assumptions on tax elasticities; these estimates are clus-
tered around zero as well. However, Favero and Giavazzi (2010) and Perotti
(2011) show that once narrative information from Romer and Romer (2010)
is incorporated into SVAR estimations, tax multipliers may be larger than
in standard SVAR estimates.
In contrast to high-income countries, we …nd that tax cuts in developing
countries do have the ability to stimulate output. A tax cut that decreases
revenues by $1 increases output by approximately $0.3, a multiplier that is
statistically di¤erent from zero. In the long run, the tax multiplier increases
to exceed 0.8, although error bands are wide around this estimate.
Figures 7-10 rea¢rm additional results from IMV. Long-run government
consumption multipliers are large, statistically di¤erent from zero, and esti-
mated to exceed one in closed economies and when exchange rates are …xed.
In contrast, multipliers are essentially zero in open economies or those oper-
ating under ‡exible exchange rates.
In all these country groupings, tax multipliers appear to exceed zero only
slightly on impact, but to be zero or negative in the long run. One exception
is closed economies, where the long-run tax multiplier appears to exceed
one (although it is not statistically di¤erent from zero). Figure 12 shows,
however, that a simple interpretation of this result as implying that tax policy
is e¤ective in stimulating output in closed economies is slightly misleading.
Government consumption decreases signi…cantly in response to tax increases
in this group of countries. As the government consumption multiplier is
large in this group of economies, the estimated decrease in output in the
long run con‡ates the e¤ects of government spending cuts with tax increases.
19Once these are accounted for, the multiplier is close to zero in this group of
countries as well.
In conclusion, in a Panel SVAR analysis of the e¤ects of government
consumption and taxes on output in several country groupings, we …nd results
on government expenditure that are similar to those in IMV: the multiplier
is substantially larger in high income countries than in developing countries,
in closed economies than in open economies, and under …xed- than under
‡exible-exchange arrangements. We also re-a¢rm results from earlier SVAR
studies on the macroeconomic e¤ects of taxes: the tax multiplier is close to
zero in high-income countries. We also report a new …nding: tax policy is
more e¤ective at stimulating short-run output in developing countries. The
impact multiplier there is approximately 0.3 and statistically di¤erent from
zero. The tax multiplier in the long run is estimated at 0.8.
5 Fiscal policy and debt dynamics
In the previous section we estimated …scal multipliers for a broad range of
countries and found very heterogeneous responses to …scal shocks. But in
some cases, the …scal multiplier was found to be sizable. Active counter-
cyclical …scal policy would seem to have some bene…t in terms of stimulated
output in these cases. However, as recent experiences in Europe and many
past experiences in developing countries have made all too clear, active …scal
management may have large costs as well. Increases in government expen-
ditures and tax cuts imply higher de…cits, which in turn imply higher debt.
Will markets tolerate the higher debt levels caused by …scal stimulus? Will
governments be forced to implement sharp and sudden …scal reversals, as
appears to currently be the case in several European countries?
Recent studies have attempted to address these questions. Reinhart and
20Rogo¤ (2010), for example, show in a panel of high-income and developing-
countries that high levels of sovereign debt lead to lower GDP growth in
subsequent years. A recent debate has emerged, also, on the e¤ectiveness of
…scal policy when debt levels are high, or conversely whether …scal contrac-
tions may at times be expansionary, as claimed, for example by Alesina and
Ardagna (2010). The IMF (2010) critiqued this result and concluded that
…scal contractions, while perhaps necessary at times, come at a short-run
cost.
In an important contribution, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) show that not
only may current SVAR estimates be biased due to the omission of debt as a
control variable, but also that its inclusion in a VAR analysis is non-trivial.
After all, the debt stock relates to the endogenous VAR variables–government
expenditure, taxes, GDP, interest rates, and in‡ation–in a highly non-linear
way. So while it may be problematic to omit debt from the regression, it is
also inappropriate to include debt as an exogenous control variable.
To …x ideas, consider augmenting (2) with a variable dt; measuring the




[CkYt￿k + Dkdt￿k] + But; (3)
where the estimation is for an individual country, and where Dk are J ￿ 1
vectors representing the feedback from debt to endogenous variables in Yt.
As mentioned, dt is itself an endogenous variable that relates to current and
past values of the endogenous variables. Favero and Giavazzi (2007) describe
the following debt-accumulation identity:
dt ￿
1 + it





21where it is the nominal interest rate and pt the price level. The …rst term
indicates that past debt incurs interest, but its ratio to GDP depreciates due
to GDP growth and in‡ation. The second term is the primary de…cit as a
percentage of GDP. (The variables gt, Tt, and yt are all in natural logarithms.)
In adapting this approach to developing countries, one must remember
that a large proportion of emerging-market debt is denominated in foreign
currency. We therefore adapt the debt accumulation identity (4) to the case
of developing countries:
dt ￿
(1 + it)[￿ (1 + ￿st) + 1 ￿ ￿]





where st is the nominal exchange rate and ￿ is the share of debt denominated
in foreign currency, assumed here to be constant.6 The additional term
indicates that debt denominated in foreign currency may accumulate also
due to exchange rate depreciation.
As outlined in Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we can now estimate (3) by
OLS and estimate the structural shocks ut using the same identi…cation as in
Section 4. However, in charting impulse responses, we track debt accumula-
tion according to (5) and allow for debt feedback to the endogenous variables
through Dk.
We augment our VAR to include the additional variables in (5), so that
now Yt = (gt;Tt;;yt;￿pt;it;￿st)
0. gt; Tt; and yt are (log) government primary
expenditure, tax revenues, and GDP, respectively; ￿pt and ￿st are the in‡a-
tion rate and the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. it is the
nominal interest rate faced by the government. As in Favero and Giavazzi
6In reality, in many emerging market countries the currency denomination of debt has
changed signi…cantly over time. However, the currency composition of foreign debt is
unlikely to be directly related to the endogenous variables in this study in the short run,
but rather determined by foreign appetite for domestic currency debt and technocratic
decisions within the Finance Ministry.
22(2007) we use instead the ratio of interest payments to the debt stock, which
is the appropriate interest rate for (5) to hold as an identity.
5.1 Debt feedback: A conceptual framework
There are at least three ways how debt feedback might a¤ect the impact
of …scal policy. First, governments may respond to high levels of debt by
increasing tax rates or lowering government expenditures. In other words
Dk (1) < 0 or Dk (2) > 0 for some k: There is some evidence that govern-
ments do respond in such a stabilizing way. Bohn (1998) shows that …scal
surpluses in the U.S. have responded to the debt-to-GDP ratio. Mendoza and
Ostry (2008) show that developing countries respond in a similar stabilizing
manner. If this is a correct characterization of government behavior, a stan-
dard SVAR estimate using (2) might understate the degree of future …scal
consolidation caused by current …scal stimulus. It might therefore overstate
the long-run e¤ects of …scal stimulus on output, as it fails to recognize that
…scal stimulus is followed by …scal consolidation.
Second, higher debts may imply higher borrowing rates it. In other words
Dk (5) > 0 for some k. If this is the case, a standard SVAR estimate would
again overstate the e¤ects of …scal policy on output. It would fail to recognize
that current …scal expansions increase the debt-to-GDP ratio, which may
cause higher interest rates. Higher interest rates may in turn crowd out
output.
Finally, high levels of debt may have direct impacts on output not (or
only partially) accounted for by the factors above. This is suggested by the
empirical results of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010), for example. One possible
theoretical channel for these results was suggested by Drazen and Helpman
(1990), who outline a theory where current …scal stimulus creates expecta-
23tions of–or uncertainty about–future …scal or monetary policy. These ex-
pectations may have an immediate e¤ect on output or prices. As the VAR
cannot identify expectations, these e¤ects will be estimated as a direct e¤ect
of debt on output.
5.2 Estimation and results
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) estimate the system (3) and (4), but found only
minor changes in the macroeconomic e¤ects of shocks to government ex-
penditure and tax revenues. Here we estimate (3) and (5) using data from
…ve developing countries and contrast our results with Favero and Giavazzi’s
(2007). The …ve countries–Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Malaysia and South Africa–
were selected based on data availability and consistency. The estimation of
the system (3) and (5) is only valid if data on the endogenous VAR variables
in Yt are consistent with time series for sovereign debt dt in equation (5). As
time series for sovereign debt are usually compiled using di¤erent methods
and sources from high-frequency …scal and macroeconomic data, (5) does not
obtain consistent estimates for most developing countries. The selected sam-
ple of countries were the only …ve in our sample of developing countries for
which data were consistent.7 These countries represent a variety of regions
(Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America), degrees of openness to
trade and exchange rate regimes.
5.2.1 Consistency of debt series
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio for the …ve countries
studied, together with the evolution of debt-to-GDP implied by the high-
frequency macroeconomic time series. Solid lines in Figure 13 represent the
7We included countries whose simulated debt series deviated from actual debt by 2
percentage points of GDP or less, on average.
24left-hand side of (5) and the dotted lines its right-hand side. A number of
factors complicate this calculation. First, time series for sovereign debt were
available only at annual frequency. We interpolate these series using piece-
wise quadratic polynomials. Second, a signi…cant proportion of revenues for
most developing countries come from non-tax sources. Ignoring this factor,
the right hand side of (5) exceeds its left hand side. The dotted lines in
Figure 13 therefore contain non-tax revenues as well as tax revenues.8 Third,
time series on ￿–the share of debt that is denominated in foreign currency–
are not available for most countries in the sample. However, we were able to
obtain one or two observations on the shares of foreign-denominated debt for
each country. When only one observation was available, we used the single
observation and treated ￿ as constant. When more than one observation was
available, we created a series of debt shares ￿t based on a linear interpolation
between the observations. The values of ￿ used are summarized in Table 5.
In all …ve cases (perhaps with the exception of South Africa), the synthetic
debt series closely match the realized debt series, indicating the validity of
debt accumulation equation (5) and the consistency of other macroeconomic
time series with debt series.
5.2.2 Results
We run a VAR(1) in order to conserve degrees of freedom in the short time
series used in this section. (This is in fact the lag order selected by the
Schwartz information criterion.) Figures 14 to 18 give the impulse responses
of the seven endogenous variables (including debt) to shocks to government
expenditure and tax revenues. The dashed lines show responses ignoring
debt feedback with 90% con…dence intervals indicated in dotted lines. The
8In the cases of Brazil and South Africa, we use the average of net non-tax revenues
over the entire time period, due to data limmitations.
25solid lines give the impulse responses with debt feedback. Each …gure gives
responses for one of the …ve countries, and each is divided into three panels.
Panel (a) gives the response to shock to government expenditure and panel
(b) to a shock to tax revenues. Panel (c) shows the dynamics of debt in
response to both shocks.
We …rst observe that the baseline responses of GDP to government ex-
penditure (in the lower left-hand corner of panel (a) in each …gure) di¤er
signi…cantly across countries. While error bands are wide, given the short
sample for each country, the response of GDP to a government expenditure
shock appears positive in Brazil and South Africa, but zero or negative in
Chile, Estonia, and Malaysia. This corresponds exactly with the observa-
tion in section 4 that the multiplier on government expenditure is larger in
relatively closed economies than in relatively open ones. (Brazil and South
Africa are classi…ed as closed and the remaining as open).
Turning to Figure 14a, the responses for Brazil highlight the importance
of incorporating debt dynamics into SVAR estimates of the e¤ects of …scal
policy. Not surprisingly, responses are similar on impact–with or without
debt feedback–as the e¤ects of debt dynamics a¤ect impulse responses only
at longer horizons. Looking at the response of GDP in the lower left-hand
panel, however, shows a signi…cant di¤erence within the …rst year follow-
ing the initial shock. While the response of output in the traditional VAR
converges gradually to zero, giving a cumulative increase in GDP of 4%,
the response including debt feedback becomes negative after approximately
a year, yielding a cumulative decrease in GDP exceeding 3%. After a year
it also departs from the 90% con…dence interval of the traditional SVAR,
indicating that the traditional VAR would place a probability of less than
5% that the best unbiased estimate of the VAR incorporating debt dynamics
re‡ect the true response. We acknowledge, however, that the standard er-
26rors of the debt-dynamics impulse responses are large enough that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the responses are identical.
The reason for this di¤erence are immediately apparent from the other
responses on the left hand side of Figure 14a. First, the response of gov-
ernment expenditure to its own shock converges to zero in the traditional
SVAR, but here becomes negative after …ve quarters (and exits the 90% con-
…dence bounds of the traditional SVAR estimate after seven quarters). As
predicted, the government decreases expenditure in response to higher debt,
so that the initial government expenditure stimulus is followed by a …scal
consolidation within two years. Similarly, tax revenues increase slightly for
the entire forecast horizon of the debt-feedback responses, but decline after
several quarters when debt feedback is ignored. This is an implied tax rate
increase in the debt-feedback response: with declining output, higher tax
revenues imply higher tax rates.9
As pointed out by Favero and Giavazzi (2007) for the case of the United
States, in Brazil too, the VAR with debt-dynamics predicts a counter-intuitive
decline in interest rates following an increase in government expenditure. In
both cases, this is potentially due to the fact that the interest rate used is
the one implied from interest payments, rather than a market interest rate.
Fiscal stimulus increases the debt stock immediately; but rising interest rates
a¤ect actual interest payments only with a lag. With the debt stock increas-
ing and interest payments constant, the interest rate implied from interest
payments is likely to go down in the short run.
Figure 14b shows the responses of variables in Yt to a 1% of GDP shock
to tax revenues. (The shock is an unanticipated increase in taxes.) The long-
run dynamics are very di¤erent once debt-feedback is accounted for. While
9An alternative explanation is that the higher in‡ation predicted by the impulses with
debt feedback is generating higher tax revenues through tax bracket creep.
27GDP declines on impact due to the increase in taxation in the traditional
SVAR–with the e¤ects gradually dying out, GDP begins to rise in the debt-
feedback responses in less than a year. In fact, the long run e¤ect of the tax
increase is positive. This is caused partially by the increase in government
expenditure that is observed in the upper left-hand panel of Figure 14b. The
response of GDP in the debt-dynamics regressions exits the 90% con…dence
interval of the traditional VAR within a year.
We also see a di¤erence in the e¤ects of tax increases on GDP on impact:
GDP declines by 0:2% without- but only by 0:1% with- debt dynamics. This
gives some evidence of the direct channel suggested in Section 5.1, where
the contractionary e¤ects of tax increases are diminished on impact. This
is perhaps because of expectations of government expenditure increases–and
therefore higher GDP–identi…ed in the upper-left-hand and lower-right-hand
responses of Figure 14a. A shock to tax revenues implies a permanently lower
level of debt, which leaves room for increases in public expenditure in the
long run.
The importance of accounting for debt dynamics is further apparent in
Figure 14c, which gives the dynamics of the (cumulative change) in the debt-
to-GDP ratio following each of the two …scal shocks. As is apparent in both
panels, the traditional SVAR implies permanent increases in the debt-to-
GDP ratio due to …scal stimuli. Once we account for the actual historical
response of …scal policy to changes in sovereign debt in the regressions incor-
porating debt dynamics, we …nd that …scal stimulus was followed by …scal
consolidation within 1-2 years of the initial loosening of …scal policy.
In Brazil, we …nd evidence that …scal stimulus is followed by consoli-
dation within a relatively short forecast horizon, while …scal consolidation
leaves room for future …scal expansion. As we noted, we …nd no evidence
of the interest rate crowding-out channel through which debt feedback was
28predicted to a¤ect output, but some potential indication of a direct channel
from higher debt to lower GDP.
Further evidence of the direct channel can be found in the case of Estonia,
in Figure 16a. The traditional VAR …nds a response of GDP to increases
in government expenditure that is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The
regressions with debt dynamics indicate, however, that this may overstate
the e¤ects of government expenditure on output in Estonia. In fact, once
debt dynamics have been accounted for, GDP declines signi…cantly in the
medium term in response to increases in government expenditure. In con-
trast, in Figure 16b, a tax increase causes a greater decline in GDP once debt
dynamics have been accounted for. This unintuitive result, can be explained
by a glance at the right-hand panel of Figure 16c. The increase in taxation
decreases the debt-to-GDP ratio only temporarily. Debt then increases in the
upcoming years. This is because government expenditure shows a persistent
increase following the increase in tax revenues, as can be seen in the upper-
left-hand panel of Figure 16a. In Estonia, the …scal space freed by increases
in taxation is more-than-fully used to increase government expenditures in
subsequent years. These increases in government expenditures increase debt
levels, which have a deleterious e¤ect on GDP.
In the remaining three countries, as in the Favero and Giavazzi’s (2007)
exploration of the United States, we …nd little di¤erence between the regres-
sions with and without debt dynamics. Only in the case of South Africa do
debt dynamics appear to diminish the e¤ects of …scal policy, due to future
policy reversals, but this e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant.
296 Conclusion
This paper explores the e¤ects of …scal policy–government expenditure and
taxes–on output in a sample of 28 developing- and high-income countries. Its
main new …ndings, using OLS, GMM and SVAR estimates are that the e¤ects
of taxes on output appear moderate in high-income countries, but signi…cant
in developing countries. Speci…cally, we …nd that cuts in personal income tax
rates have a signi…cant impact on economic growth in the following year in
developing countries. In contrast to …ndings in SVAR studies of high-income
countries, we …nd that tax policy appears more e¤ective at stimulating output
than increases in government expenditures.
The paper also incorporates debt dynamics into a Structural VAR esti-
mation and concludes that in some cases–Brazil and Estonia in the current
study–incorporating debt dynamics into a …scal SVAR can have a substan-
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Table 1: Tax Revenue Elasticities: Quarterly Estimates
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Profit  Output  Output Average
Elasticity Elasticity of Elasticity of Output Elasticity
PIT SS of CIT Wages Profits PIT SS CIT VAT PIT SS CIT VAT of Tax Revenue
A B C D E F=AD G=BD H=FC I J K L M FJ + GK + HL + IM
Argentina 1.82 0.95 1.00 1.325 0.578 2.41 1.26 0.58 1.206 7.5% 23.6% 14.8% 54.1% 1.22
(0.26) (0.18) (0.12) 5.2% 16.6% 10.4% 37.9%
Australia 1.58 - 1.00 0.905 1.263 1.43 - 1.26 0.835 61.9% - 18.5% 5.5% 1.48
(0.12) (0.18) (0.07) 43.4% 0.0% 13.0% 3.9%
Brazil 1.95 0.92 1.15 1.238 1.274 2.42 1.14 1.46 1.001 13.9% 39.5% 20.5% - 1.33
(0.19) (0.17) (0.14) 9.7% 27.7% 14.4% 0.0%
Belgium 1.49 1.00 1.00 0.782 1.163 1.17 0.78 1.16 0.787 46.2% 45.6% 8.5% 22.9% 0.95
(0.12) (0.30) (0.08) 32.3% 31.9% 5.9% 16.0%
Bulgaria 1.64 0.98 1.02 0.960 0.571 1.57 0.94 0.58 0.993 15.3% 42.9% 12.7% 45.4% 0.80
(0.24) (0.15) (0.27) 10.7% 30.0% 8.9% 31.8%
Canada 1.28 0.75 1.00 0.817 1.167 1.02 0.58 1.16 0.810 50.0% 19.0% 12.0% 19.0% 0.92
(0.68) (0.62) (0.07)
Chile 2.25 0.77 1.00 0.996 1.692 2.24 0.77 1.69 1.038 9.1% 10.3% 27.8% 60.3% 1.28
(0.12) (0.66) (0.09) 6.4% 7.2% 19.4% 42.2%
Colombia 2.23 1.01 0.95 0.868 1.623 1.93 0.88 1.54 0.992 46.8% 28.3% 9.7% 46.8% 1.34
(0.10) (0.31) (0.10) 32.7% 19.8% 6.8% 32.8%
Croatia 1.62 1.00 1.00 1.104 1.623 1.79 1.10 1.62 0.873 12.8% 48.2% 9.2% 49.3% 1.12
(0.40) (0.51) (0.33) 8.9% 33.8% 6.5% 34.6%
Cyprus 1.96 1.00 1.07 0.931 1.481 1.82 0.93 1.58 1.229 15.1% 45.3% 20.4% 28.1% 1.25
(0.07) (0.22) (0.15) 10.6% 31.7% 14.3% 19.6%
Czech Rep 1.47 1.00 1.00 0.950 1.132 1.39 0.95 1.13 0.843 17.5% 61.2% 17.1% 25.6% 1.02
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) 12.2% 42.9% 11.9% 17.9%
Dominican Rep. 2.40 0.00 1.00 1.062 1.324 2.55 - 1.32 0.993 18.8% 0.0% 39.1% 15.1% 1.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) 13.2% 0.0% 27.4% 10.6%
Estonia 1.20 1.00 1.00 0.993 1.223 1.19 0.99 1.22 1.105 30.1% 49.1% 7.0% 37.9% 1.09
(0.14) (0.22) (0.10) 21.1% 34.4% 4.9% 26.6%
France 1.72 0.92 1.00 0.678 1.487 1.17 0.62 1.49 0.918 19.8% 58.0% 7.9% 25.4% 0.85
(0.10) (0.26) (0.07) 13.9% 40.6% 5.6% 17.8%
Germany 1.43 0.83 1.00 0.515 1.267 0.74 0.43 1.27 0.602 38.1% 54.6% 6.5% 24.7% 0.60
(0.15) (0.29) (0.12) 26.6% 38.2% 4.6% 17.3%
Hungary 1.39 0.98 1.00 0.768 1.153 1.06 0.75 1.15 0.985 20.6% 51.3% 9.0% 32.2% 0.91
(0.27) (0.00) (0.25) 14.5% 35.9% 6.3% 22.6%
Latvia 1.18 1.00 1.00 1.421 1.176 1.67 1.41 1.18 1.233 27.1% 45.5% 9.8% 35.8% 1.40
(0.25) (0.17) (0.16) 19.0% 31.9% 6.9% 25.1%
Lithuania 1.29 1.00 1.10 1.287 1.310 1.66 1.29 1.44 1.020 33.9% 41.6% 8.0% 36.3% 1.32
(0.16) (0.27) (0.11) 23.8% 29.1% 5.6% 25.4%
Malaysia 3.58 1.00 1.10 0.971 1.288 3.48 0.97 1.42 1.131 18.9% 0.0% 47.8% 14.6% 1.84
(0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 13.2% 0.0% 33.5% 10.2%
Mexico 1.55 0.97 1.00 1.151 1.401 1.79 1.11 1.40 1.379 22.4% 17.9% 28.7% 40.0% 1.47
(0.13) (0.26) (0.16) 15.7% 12.6% 20.1% 28.0%
Peru 2.96 1.00 1.00 0.796 1.376 2.35 0.80 1.38 0.797 9.1% 14.1% 18.7% 58.8% 0.82
(0.10) (0.12) (0.05) 6.3% 9.8% 13.1% 41.2%
Poland 1.29 0.95 1.00 1.001 1.106 1.29 0.95 1.11 0.871 22.9% 49.9% 10.8% 28.5% 1.01
(0.18) (0.20) (0.09) 16.0% 35.0% 7.5% 19.9%
Slovakia 1.64 0.97 1.00 0.796 1.153 1.30 0.77 1.15 0.763 13.9% 58.7% 12.5% 32.1% 0.87
(0.18) (0.00) (0.09) 9.8% 41.1% 8.8% 22.5%
Slovenia 1.54 1.00 1.00 1.298 1.153 2.00 1.30 1.15 0.772 22.1% 53.9% 6.2% 36.8% 1.26
(0.11) (0.00) (0.12) 15.5% 37.7% 4.3% 25.8%
South Africa 1.26 - 1.00 1.104 1.874 1.39 - 1.87 1.267 51.7% - 36.4% 23.0% 1.52
(0.10) (0.28) (0.15) 36.2% 0.0% 25.5% 16.1%
Thailand 2.46 0.72 1.05 0.773 1.068 1.90 0.55 1.12 0.883 19.5% - 30.5% 37.2% 1.07
(0.08) (0.32) (0.04) 13.6% 0.0% 21.4% 26.1%
UK 1.53 1.02 1.00 0.831 1.391 1.28 0.85 1.39 1.056 39.6% 25.5% 13.0% 25.2% 1.13
(0.09) (0.32) (0.09) 27.8% 17.8% 9.1% 17.6%
USA 1.35 0.85 1.00 0.809 1.638 1.09 0.69 1.64 0.930 52.9% 36.6% 13.1% 16.6% 1.00
(0.05) (0.52) (0.06) 37.1% 25.7% 9.2% 11.6%
Wage elasticity of Output elasticity of Tax Revenue share of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿OLS Arellano-Bond OLS Arellano-Bond
PIT
-0.14                                  
(.055)
-0.16                                  
(.081)
-0.20                                  
(.080)
-0.37                                  
(.091)
CIT




0.018                                  
(.060)
0.034                                  
(.061)
VAT                                                
0.38                  
(.129)
0.51                    
(.55)
0.44                    
(.24)




0.35                  
(.043)
0.37                    
(.10)
UR
-00079              
(.00036)
0.0035                
(0.0011)
-0.015              
(.0012)




1.52                 (.31) 2.95                 (.23)
1.62                   
(.34)
2.77                    
(.44)




Table 4: Tax Changes and GDP
Dependent Variable: Change in GDP














1. Quarterly Public Finance Database: This dataset includes quarterly time series for total government revenue, tax 
revenue, revenues from social security, total expenditures (current and capital), interest payments and transfers.  The 
data refer to the consolidated general government or the consolidated central government (including social security), 
depending on the existence of quarterly accounts for the general government in each country.  Data are from national 
sources, with the exception of the UK and Canada from the OECD Economic Outlook and Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia from Eurostat.  Links to these sources 
are  provided  below.    For  the  Latin  American  and  Asian  countries  in  the  sample  the  data  correspond  to  central 
government accounts. For the remaining countries the data refers to the Consolidated General Government.
2. Annual  Tax  Revenue  Breakdown:  This  dataset  contains  the  breakdown  of  tax  revenues  by  their  components: 
Personal Income Tax Revenue, Corporate Income Tax Revenue, Value Added Tax Revenues (or Sales Tax Revenues, 
for countries with no VAT) and Social Security Contribution Revenues.  This database was constructed separately 
from the Quarterly Public Finance Dataset since these series are not always reported together and, many times, the tax 
revenue breakdown is in annual frequency.  For Latin American and Asian countries, where Central Government is 
being considered, only federal tax revenues are included.  Data was taken from national sources, with the exception of 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico from ECLAC; Canada, UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary from OECDstats and Cyprus from the IMF’s IFS.
3. Statutory Tax Rates: The data related to the statutory tax rates, comprised by tax brackets and rates of Personal 
Income Tax, Corporate Income Tax, Social Security and VAT, comes from the OECD Tax Database for OECD 
countries (www.oecd.org/tax); from the annually tax books “Individual Taxes: Worldwide Summaries” and “Corporate 
Taxes: Worldwide Summaries”, published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers until 2005; from the PWC tax webpage which  
has the latest statutory tax information (www.pwc.com/gx/en/worldwide-tax-summaries); and also from the KPMG
Individual and Corporate Tax Rate Survey from 2006-2009.
a. Personal Income Tax is generally progressive and composed by several brackets, but there are a few exceptions 
of countries and years in which a flat rate applies (Bulgaria and Czech Republic after 2008). 
b. Corporate Income Tax is usually given by a flat rate on profits, although there are also a few exceptions. Brazil 
has a progressive tax schedule with two brackets and Bulgaria had a progressive tax schedule in the years 1999-
2001. For Lithuania (after 2003), Cyprus (1995-2004), Malaysia and Thailand have different tax rates according to 
the firm size.  In Argentina and Colombia, if the resulting chargeable corporate tax is small enough, there is a 
complementary tax on assets.  According to the perceived regressiveness/progressiveness of the tax schedule the 
imputed profit elasticities in those cases vary from 1.0 to 1.1. 
c. VAT (or Sales Tax) although there are many deductions according to the nature of each product, we consider the 
standard flat rate.  In the USA, where there are State, County and Municipal sales taxes, we consider the national 
average sales-tax rate. 
d. Social Security usually has regressive tax rates with several brackets.  UK is the only exception, since a high tax 
credit offsets the effect of regressiveness from the tax brackets.  The income elasticities of social security tax 
revenues, computed in a similar way to the personal income tax elasticities, range from 0.75-1.10.    
4. Gini  Coefficients:  The  Gini  Coefficients  were  used  to  log-normalize  of  the  labor  earnings  distribution  for  the 
computation of personal income tax and social security elasticities.  Series on Gini coefficients were taken from the 
World Bank’s Povcal Net database for developing countries and national sources for high-income countries with the 
exception of France, Germany and Belgium, taken from Eurostat.  Complementary data from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators were also been used to fill in missing observations and check for consistency.  We 
interpolated remaining missing observations by a regression of the Gini coefficient on GDP for existing years.  This 
allows for predictable shifts in the income distribution due to cyclical conditions to further inform the output elasticity 
of tax revenues.   5. Average labor earnings:  Data is taken from national household income surveys with the exception of Croatia and 
the UK from the Eurostat and the ILO; Malaysia from the Povcal Net database; and Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and 
South Africa from the ILO.   
6. Complementary Data for the Panel Analysis 
a. Trade Shock: The trade shock series are based on data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade database. 
b. Unemployment Rate: The Unemployment rate data have been collected in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database. 
Argentina www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda Mexico www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx
www.indec.gov.ar www.inegi.org.mx






Canada www.statcan.gc.ca South Africa www.reservebank.co.za
Chile www.dipres.cl Thailand nso.go.th/en
www.bcentral.cl UK www.ifs.org.uk
Colombia www.banrep.gov.co USA www.bea.gov
www.dane.gov.co www.dol.gov
Croatia www.mfin.hr/en World Economic Outlook www.imf.org/weo
Cyprus www.mof.gov.cy Direction of Trade www.imfstatistics.org/DOT
Czech Rep www.czso.cz Povcal Net www.worldbank.org/poverty
Dominican R. www.hacienda.gov.do World Development Indicators data.worldbank.org
www.one.gob.do Eurostat epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Estonia www.stat.ee/en International Finance Statistics www.imfstatistics.org
France www.insee.fr/en OECDstats stats.oecd.org
Latvia  www.csb.gov.lv CEPALstats websie.eclac.cl/sisgen
Lithuania www.stat.gov.lt/en LABORsta laborsta.ilo.org
Malaysia www.statistics.gov.my OECD Economic Outlook www.sourceoecd.org
www.anm.gov.my
Useful Links for Data SourcesArgentina 1993Q1 - 2009Q3 Germany 1999Q1 - 2009Q1
Australia 1959Q3 - 2009Q3 Hungary 1999Q1 - 2009Q3
Belgium 1991Q1 - 2009Q3 Latvia 1999Q1 - 2009Q3
Brazil 1997Q1 - 2009Q3 Lithuania 1999Q1 - 2009Q3
Bulgaria 1999Q1 - 2009Q3 Malaysia 1999Q1 - 2009Q3
Canada 1970Q1 - 2009Q3 Mexico 1993Q1 - 2009Q3
Chile 1989Q1 - 2009Q3 Peru 1993Q1 - 2009Q3
Colombia 1995Q1 - 2009Q3 Poland 1993Q1 - 2009Q3
Croatia 2004Q3 - 2009Q3 Slovakia 1993Q1 - 2009Q3
Cyprus 1995Q1 - 2009Q3 Slovenia 1993Q1 - 2009Q3
Czech Rep 1999Q1 - 2009Q3 South Africa 1990Q1 - 2009Q3
Dominican Rep 2002Q1 - 2009Q3 Thailand 1993Q4 - 2009Q3
Estonia 1999Q1 - 2009Q3 United Kingdom 1970Q1 - 2009Q3
France 1991Q1 - 2009Q1 United States 1947Q1 - 2009Q3
Time Series Coverage for the SVAR